

2. The information submitted in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) was taken from report of Commanding Officer of CONDOIR dated 29 December 1941, and verified by extracts from Signal Log of WARD.

3. Statements by the Officer of the Deck, Ensign R. C. McCloy, USNR, U. S. District Cn. 2c USNR, and R. B. Chaves, Sen. 1c, USNR (Helmsman), on watch aboard the CONDOIR at the time, indicate the following:-- At about 0650 on 7 December 1941 the CONDOIR was conducting sweeping operations approximately 1½ miles south west of entrance buoy. The attention of Ensign McCloy was attracted to what, in the darkness, appeared to be a wave. After studying it momentarily, he called Ulrick and with further examination with binoculars they both were convinced that what they saw was the periscope of a submerged submarine. Chaves could make out a wake but no periscope. The best estimate of least distance from CONDOIR to periscope at any time is about 50 yards.

4. The CONDOIR at 0657 informed the WARD, Channel Entrance Patrol, by visual of this contact. The WARD immediately instituted a search for the submarine. At about 0650 she sank an unidentified submarine and made report as recorded in her file 779 of December 12, 1941.

5. No report was made to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, until the WARD had actually and definitely established contact with an unidentified submarine.

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#### HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 77

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

C-A16-1/A&N/ND14  
(01171)

*Confidential*

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.

(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29 October 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).

1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R. N., who gave his views on this subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; his comments in connection therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Aliamanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived therefrom.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefited by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post; this

is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air Corps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.

7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Headquarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.

8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What should be done later in connection with a combined operating center can best be determined by actual experience.

C. C. Bloch.  
C. C. BLOCH.

Advance copy to: Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.

*Confidential*

Admiral C. C. BLOCH,

*Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21, 1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined operating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.

While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same structure. The different elements have distinct missions, and while it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.

The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Aliamanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, antiaircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter. Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrangements can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.

It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, consideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post,

and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

(Du-Et)

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-6

(SC) A16-3(9)

Doc. 37746

Serial 01212

Confidential

FOURTH MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, War Plans Division.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Combined operating center from Army and Navy.

References:

(a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.

(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December 1941.

(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. Turner.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:

Op-12B

Op-14

Op 30

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30C-DG

(SC) A16-3(9)

Doc. 37746

MEMO FOR CAPTAIN READ

DECEMBER 31, 1941.

Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to CNO via Cinpac C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)

1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now does, I am returning this informally.

2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed the boat".

R. W. Cary

R. W. CARY

Room 1066



Op-14/LJH  
(SC) A16-3(9)  
Serial 01114  
*Confidential*

5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops, respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local duties and routine.

S. C. HOOPER.

In reply to Initials and No.  
Op-14/LJH  
(SC) A16-3(9)  
Serial 01114

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, December 6, 1941.

*Confidential*

*Second Memorandum Endorsement*

From: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.  
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.  
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded.
2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme command is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.
3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel duties, and command of local units of their respective over-all commands, will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.
4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.

OP-12B-6  
(SC) A16-3(9)  
Doc. 37746  
Serial 01212  
*Confidential*

(Du-Et)

*Fourth Memorandum Endorsement*

From: The Director, War Plans Division.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Combined operating center for Army and Navy.  
References:

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.

(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CRO190) and 292120 (CRO346) of December 1941.

(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to :

Op-12B

Op-14

Op-30

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-7-My

(SC)A16-3(9)

Serial 0134212

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington

*Confidential—First Memorandum Endorsement*

NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

From : The Director, War Plans Division.

To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.

Via : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.

Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as desired.

2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers, comment, and recommendations be returned.

R. K. Turner.

R. K. TURNER.

[2]

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

*Table of corrections*

Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

CONFIDENTIAL

Urdis 149400 to Budocks X Request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CincPac Comfourteen Comstrain Comsubfor Compatwng and parallel activities of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and

Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X Comment with recommendations including location and estimates of cost requested.

[Handwritten:] For Cdr Griswold—General Bd.

(This is a copy made from microfilm records.) 19 July 45.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-68

UNITED STATES FLEET.  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

CinC File No.  
A1/A&N/(18)  
Serial 01810  
*Confidential*

*1st Endorsement*  
on Com-14 C-A16-1  
A&N/ND14 (01171)  
dated Nov. 3, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.

2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the following:

(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of orders and information.

(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.

(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.

(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication system were damaged or destroyed.

(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post—with the post necessarily in an inactive area.

(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.



5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph (1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without further delay.

H. E. Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 78

From: Tokyo.  
To: (Circular telegram)  
7 December 1941  
(Plain Japanese language using code names)  
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.  
Note: The above is the translation furnished the President and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, our code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

Note: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

"Relations between Japan and . . . . . are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States."

Now: See JD #685.

Tokyo Circular #2494

ORIGINAL

BT DK JAH

S T DROU 41

021 S TOKYO 19 T 8598 J41

KOSHI PANAMA

URGENT #2494 KOYANAGI RIJYORI SEIRINOTUGOO AKRUNITUKI HAIT-  
TORI MINAMI KINENBUNGO SETURITU WIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIK  
YUU DENTOO ARITASI STOP—TOGO

1206 S JP  
7029

S 1307 T 8598 ORIN

ORISE OVALS RPWMO RPNMO RTJMO RWFMO GNDME

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION

BT D9 JAH S T DROU 41

022 S TOKYO 19 T 8598 JG KOSHI HAVANA

023 S TOKYO 19 T 8598 JG RIYUJI HONOLULU

024 S TOKYO 19 T 8598 JG RIYUJI NEWYORK

025 S TOKYO 22 T 8598 JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER

026 S TOKYO 22 T 8598 JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWAONT

(Same text and sign as our NR5651.)

1229 JP  
7029

JD 1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)